Learn Cookie From Chrome 80 Samesite

Chrome 80 enable a new flag by default, SameSite. Although revert this change later.

Google rolls back Chrome feature that blocks cross-site tracking.

Concepts

Let’s start with some concepts.

Setter

Cookie can be set by either Web Server or Front-end codes.

When request for GET /index.html HTTP/1.1, the Web Server can send this back:

Content-type: text/html
Set-Cookie: sessionToken=abc123; Expires=Wed, 09 Jun 2021 10:18:14 GMT

Then cookie with key sessionToken will be set on the client browser side.

Keeper

Cookie is kept and only kept by browser. Thus the cookie can be accessed and kept among different web pages, after restart the brower.

Sender

Cookie is sent by and only by browser.

You shouldn’t and can’t sepcify the cookie you want to send using the front-end codes.^1

Browser is the gate-keeper, safe-guard of the cookie!

Reader

Cookie is usually read/used by Web Server or front-end codes.

Web Server use line like request.cookies.get() to read the cookie sent by the client browser.

On the front-end, JS code can read the cookie from the current location, by document.cookie. Current document.location is where the JS code is running at, aka the URL shown on the address bar. (Except for IFrame and cookie with Http-only attribute.)

Origin

Orgin, as a namespacing strategy, happens on both Web Server and client browser sides.

Set Within The Specific Orgin

On the browser sides, there are two kinds of cookies, first-party and third-party cookies.

Cookies that match the domain of the current site, i.e. what’s displayed in the browser’s address bar, are referred to as first-party cookies. Similarly, cookies from domains other than the current site are referred to as third-party cookies.

For example, if the user requests http://example.com/index.html and return is,

<!-- http://example.com/index.html -->
<html>
...
<img src="http://cdn.com/cat.png" />
<ul id="list-of-books"></ul>
...
<script>
...
response = AJAX_REQUEST_FOR("https://example.com/books");
document.getElementById.innerHTML=FORMAT(response);
...
</script>
</html>

If all three web servers on http://example.com, http://cdn.com and https://example.com response with Set-Cookie: token=xxx header,

  1. For Orgin http://example.com , browser received, set and kept a cookie token=abc
  2. For Orgin http://cdn.com , browser received, set and kept a cookie token=xyz
  3. For Orgin https://example.com , browser received, set and kept a cookie token=123

As http: and https: for the same domain actually belongs to different origin,

An origin is defined as a combination of URI scheme, host name, and port number.

So http://example.com and https://example.com are different origin because of two differences,

Send Within The Specific Orgin

Let’s say, when user refresh this page, (with cache disabled), the browser sends requests, (shown in curl grammer),

So we can see that browser only send the cookie corresponding to the request origin, regardless the fact that the current document.location == http://example.com.

Say on another page, http://example99.com/index.html is also using the cute image on http://cdn.com/cat.png, browser will also send the token=cute with the request happens on that page.

Origin With Domain

If a cookie’s Domain and Path attributes are not specified by the server, they default to the domain and path of the resource that was requested.

For example, if the Web Server response to http://example.com/index.html with,

Set-Cookie: sessionToken=abc123;

with no Domain set, the request for http://docs.example.com/, cookie sessionToken=abc123 will NOT be sent.

If the response is,

Set-Cookie: sessionToken=abc123; Domain=.example.com;

the cookie will be sent.

The prepending dot "."example.com is optional in recent standards, but can be added for compatibility.

Let’s explain the following topics using the concepts introduced above.

Samesite Policy Enabled By Default In Chrome 80

First, the site terminology in the samesite is NOT just origin, but also the public suffix.

This policy uses two attributes when set the cookie, Secure and SameSite. SameSite attibute works only when Secure is also set. e.g. Set-Cookie: token=123; SameSite=None; Secure.

If you set SameSite=Strict, your cookie will only be sent in a first-party context.
SameSite=Lax would not restrict originating site.
SameSite=None would allow third-party (cross-site) cookies.

Chrome 80 by default adds SameSite=Lax to all the cookies without specifying SameSite attribute. chromestatus, chromium.org.

With SameSite=Lax, in the above Origin example, requesting for http://cdn.com/cat.png on http://example.com won’t send the token=cute which belongs to origin http://cdn.com.

If you use SameSite=Strict, the restriction is even harder: by clicking a link on the http://example.com/index.html, like <a href="http://cdn.com"></a>, browser won’t send token=cute on the initial request for http://cdn.com!

With attribute SameSite=Strict, the browsers should only send these cookies with requests originated from the same domain/site as the target domain.

A Complete Example

If you are still confused, see this.

That’s where SameSite=Lax comes in by allowing the cookie to be sent with these top-level navigations. Let’s revisit the cat article example from above where another site is referencing your content. They make use of your photo of the cat directly and provide a link through to your original article.

<!-- exmaple.com/index.html -->
<p>Look at this amazing cat!</p>
<img src="https://blog.example/blog/img/amazing-cat.png" />
<p>Read the <a href="https://blog.example/blog/cat.html">article</a>.</p>

And the cookie has been set as so:

Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Lax

When the reader is on the other person’s blog the cookie will not be sent when the browser requests amazing-cat.png. However when the reader follows the link through to cat.html on your blog, that request will include the cookie. This makes Lax a good choice for cookies affecting the display of the site with Strict being useful for cookies related to actions your user is taking.

Effect On Front-End Code

The default SameSite=Lax setting, will fail the request for external resources. For example in the case of,

  1. User login to http://bookshelf.com/login and save the cookie token=123
  2. User browses bookreviews.com and want to GET bookshelf.com/user1/favorite shown in the widget.
  3. If bookshelf.com needs the token to see user’s favorites, this request will fail as the token=123 is not sent by the Chrome 80.

To solve this, the developer of bookshelf.com needs to,

  1. Change the login page using https, https://bookshelf.com/login
  2. Send the above cookie when login successfully,
    Set-Cookie: token=123; Secure; SameSite=None
    

Force Opt-Out From This Feature In User’s Side

  1. Copy-paste chrome://flags on address bar and press Enter.
  2. Search samesite by default cookies using searching feature on the top of the page.
  3. Change the highlighted item in the filtered list (should be the first item), from Default to Disabled.

CORS

A web page may freely embed cross-origin images, stylesheets, scripts, iframes, and videos. Certain “cross-domain” requests, notably AJAX requests, are forbidden by default by the same-origin security policy. CORS defines a way in which a browser and server can interact to determine whether it is safe to allow the cross-origin request.

On the browser side, for “cross-domain” requests, for example, during opening the page:

<!-- http://www.exmaple.com/index.html -->
<p>Look at this amazing cat!</p>
<img src="https://blog.example/blog/img/amazing-cat.png" />

browser send http requst OPTIONS https://blog.example/blog/img/amazing-cat.png with

Origin: http://www.example.com/index.html

On the Web Server side,

You can simply send Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * back for allowing all requests.

  • Cross-site scripting. If the website that allows its users to post unfiltered HTML and JavaScript content. E.g. `Click here!
  • DNS cache poisoning. An attacker could use DNS cache poisoning to create a fabricated DNS entry of attacker.www.example.com that points to the IP address of the attacker’s server and send user an email with the link to attacker.www.example.com.
  • Cross-site request forgery. Attacker send email with an image <img src="http://bank.example.com/transfer?account=bob&amount=1000000&to=mallory">

Refs.

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie
  2. https://stackoverflow.com/questions/15198231/why-cookies-and-set-cookie-headers-cant-be-set-while-making-xmlhttprequest-usin
  3. https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained/
  4. https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/what-is-mixed-content